Memey, a young uneducated woman from Java in Indonesia, was in a very difficult situation early in the twenty-first century. Her husband had died, leaving her in poverty with a young child. When she heard from a neighbor about waitressing opportunities in Malaysia, she saw a way of providing for her son. So she entered Malaysia illegally and was met by a contact person, who took her shopping for clothes and makeup. “After dinner,” she later recalled, “a man came for me and took me to a hotel room nearby to start work. That was when it finally dawned on me that it was not a waitressing job. I was being made to work as a sex worker.” Witnessing other women severely beaten or threatened, Memey was afraid to run away. After about four months in this situation, she was able to escape with the help of a sympathetic client, returning to Indonesia with bitter memories and an HIV infection. Subsequently she found work with an organization devoted to helping other women in her position.¹

Memey was but one of millions of women victimized by international networks of sex trafficking. Those networks represented one dark and tragic thread in a vast web of political relationships, economic transactions, cultural influences, and the movement of people across international borders that linked the world’s separate countries and regions, binding them together more tightly, but also more contentiously. By the 1990s, this process of accelerating engagement among distant peoples was widely known as globalization. Debating the pros and cons of this encompassing pattern of interaction and exchange has been central to global discourse over the past half century or more. More importantly, it has

-One World- This NASA photograph, showing both the earth and the moon, reveals none of the national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic boundaries that have long divided humankind. Such pictures have both reflected and helped create a new planetary consciousness among growing numbers of people.
been central to the lives of billions of individuals, like Memey, and to the societies they inhabit.

Although the term was relatively new, the process was not. From the viewpoint of world history, the genealogy of globalization reached far into the past. The Arab, Mongol, Russian, Chinese, and Ottoman empires; the Silk Road, Indian Ocean, and trans-Saharan trade routes; the spread of Buddhism, Christianity, and especially Islam—all of these connections had long linked the societies of the Eastern Hemisphere, bringing new rulers, religions, products, diseases, and technologies to many of its peoples. Later, in the centuries after 1500, European maritime voyages and colonizing efforts launched the Columbian exchange, incorporating the Western Hemisphere and inner Africa firmly and permanently into a genuinely global network of communication, exchange, and often exploitation. During the nineteenth century, as the Industrial Revolution took hold and Western nations began a new round of empire building in Asia and Africa, that global network tightened further, and its role as generator of social and cultural change only increased.

These were the foundations on which twentieth-century globalization was built. A number of prominent developments of the past century, explored in the previous three chapters, operated on a global scale: the world wars, the Great Depression, communism, the cold war, the end of empire, and the growing prominence of developing countries. But global interaction quickened its pace and deepened its impact after World War II. From the immense range of interactions that make up modern globalization, this chapter focuses on four major processes: the transformation of the world economy, the emergence of global feminism, the response of world religions to modernity, and the growing awareness of humankind’s enormous impact on the environment.

The Transformation of the World Economy

When most people speak of globalization, they are referring to the immense acceleration in international economic transactions that took place in the second half of the twentieth century and continued into the twenty-first. Many have come to see this process as almost natural, certainly inevitable, and practically unstoppable. Yet the first half of the twentieth century, particularly the decades between the two world wars, witnessed a deep contraction of global economic linkages as the aftermath of World War I and then the Great Depression wreaked havoc on the world economy. International trade, investment, and labor migration dropped sharply as major states turned inward, favoring high tariffs and economic autonomy in the face of a global economic collapse.

The aftermath of World War II was very different. The capitalist victors in that conflict, led by the United States, were determined to avoid any return to such Depression-era conditions. At a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in
1944, they forged a set of agreements and institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) that laid the foundation for postwar globalization. This “Bretton Woods system” negotiated the rules for commercial and financial dealings among the major capitalist countries, while promoting relatively free trade, stable currency values linked to the U.S. dollar, and high levels of capital investment.

Technology also contributed to the acceleration of economic globalization. Containerized shipping, huge oil tankers, and air express services dramatically lowered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A MAP OF TIME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1919–1946</strong></td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1945</strong></td>
<td>United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1960</strong></td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1962</strong></td>
<td>Rachel Carson publishes <em>Silent Spring</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1963</strong></td>
<td>Betty Friedan publishes <em>The Feminine Mystique</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1967</strong></td>
<td>Six-day Arab-Israeli war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970</strong></td>
<td>Greenpeace established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1973–1974</strong></td>
<td>Arab members of OPEC place an embargo on oil exports to the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1979</strong></td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women adopted by UN; Iranian revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1982</strong></td>
<td>Law of the Sea Convention establishes international agreement about the uses of the world’s oceans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994</strong></td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995</strong></td>
<td>World Trade Organization created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1997</strong></td>
<td>Kyoto protocol on global warming introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001</strong></td>
<td>September 11 attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td>Global economic crisis begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td>Osama bin Laden killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2013–2014</strong></td>
<td>The Islamic State, a radical jihadist organization, proclaims a new caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014</strong></td>
<td>Tunisia’s new constitution enshrines many rights of women; World Bank declares China the world’s largest economy; People’s Climate March in conjunction with the UN-sponsored Leaders Climate Summit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are important examples of institutions that promoted free trade in the second half of the twentieth century.
transportation costs, while fiber-optic cables and later the Internet provided the communication infrastructure for global economic interaction. In the developing countries, population growth, especially when tied to growing economies and modernizing societies, further fueled globalization as dozens of new nations entered the world economy.

The kind of economic globalization taking shape in the 1970s and later was widely known as neoliberalism. Major capitalist countries such as the United States and Great Britain abandoned many earlier political controls on economic activity as their leaders and businesspeople increasingly viewed the entire world as a single market. This approach to the world economy favored the reduction of tariffs, the free global movement of capital, a mobile and temporary workforce, the privatization of many state-run enterprises, the curtailing of government efforts to regulate the economy, and both tax and spending cuts. Powerful international lending agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF imposed such free market and pro-business conditions on many poor countries if they were to qualify for much-needed loans. The collapse of the state-controlled economies of the communist world only furthered such unrestricted global capitalism. In this view, the market, operating both globally and within nations, was the most effective means of generating the holy grail of economic growth. As communism collapsed by the end of the twentieth century, “capitalism was global and the globe was capitalist.”

**Reglobalization**

These conditions provided the foundations for a dramatic quickening of global economic transactions after World War II, a “reglobalization” of the world economy following the contractions of the 1930s. This immensely significant process was expressed in the accelerating circulation of goods, capital, and people.

World trade, for example, skyrocketed from a value of some $57 billion in 1947 to about $18.3 trillion in 2012. Department stores and supermarkets around the world stocked their shelves with goods from every part of the globe. Twinings of London marketed its 120 blends of tea in more than 100 countries, and the Australian-based Kiwi shoe polish was sold in 180 countries. In 2005, about 70 percent of Walmart products reportedly included components from China. And the following year, Toyota replaced General Motors as the world’s largest automaker, with manufacturing facilities in at least eighteen countries.

Money as well as goods achieved an amazing global mobility in three ways. The first was “foreign direct investment,” whereby a firm in, say, the United States opens a factory in China or Mexico (see Map 23.1). Such investment exploded after 1960 as companies in rich countries sought to take advantage of cheap labor, tax breaks, and looser environmental regulations in developing countries. A second form of money in motion has been the short-term movement of capital, in which investors annually spent trillions of dollars purchasing foreign currencies or stocks likely to increase in value and often sold them quickly thereafter, with unsettling conse-
Investment across national borders has been a major expression of globalization. This map shows the global distribution of investment inflows as of 1998. Notice which countries or regions were receiving the most investment from abroad and which received the least. How might you account for this pattern? Keep in mind that some regions, such as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, were major sources of such investment as well as recipients of it.

Consequences. A third form of money movement involved the personal funds of individuals. By the end of the twentieth century, international credit cards had taken hold almost everywhere, allowing for easy transfer of money across national borders. In 2012, MasterCard was accepted at some 33 million businesses in 220 countries or territories.

Central to the acceleration of economic globalization have been huge global businesses known as transnational corporations (TNCs), which produce goods or deliver services simultaneously in many countries. For example, Mattel Corporation produced Barbie, that quintessentially American doll, in factories located in Indonesia, Malaysia, and China, using molds from the United States, plastic and hair from Taiwan and Japan, and cotton cloth from China. From distribution centers in Hong Kong, more than a billion Barbies were sold in 150 countries by 1999.
Burgeoning in number since the 1960s, those TNCs, such as Royal Dutch Shell, Sony, and General Motors, often were of such an enormous size and had such economic clout that their assets and power dwarfed that of many countries. By 2000, 51 of the world's 100 largest economic units were in fact TNCs, not countries. In the permissive economic climate of recent decades, such firms have been able to move their facilities quickly from place to place in search of the lowest labor costs or the least restrictive environmental regulations. During one five-year period, for example, Nike closed twenty factories and opened thirty-five others, often thousands of miles apart.

Accompanying the movement of goods and capital in the globalizing world of the twentieth century were new patterns of human migration, driven by war, revolution, poverty, and the end of empire. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I witnessed a large-scale exchange of populations as over a million Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey relocated to Greece, while some 400,000 Turkish-speaking Muslims living in Greece moved in the other direction. Fleeing anti-Semitism, fascism, and the Holocaust, Jews emigrated to what is now Israel in large numbers, generating in the process a flow of Palestinian refugees to settlements in neighboring countries. Political repression and forced labor in the Soviet Union pushed millions into the camps of the gulag, primarily in Siberia. In South Africa, an industrializing economy and apartheid policies drew millions of male workers from the countryside into mines and factories, often under horrific conditions. In the early twenty-first century, over a million Chinese have migrated to Africa, where Chinese trade and investment have mounted.

But perhaps the most significant pattern of global migration since the 1960s has featured a vast movement of people from the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the industrialized world of Europe and North America. Pakistanis, Indians, and West Indians moved to Great Britain; Algerians and West Africans to France; Turks and Kurds to Germany; Filipinos, Koreans, Cubans, Mexicans, and Haitians to the United States. A considerable majority of these people have been dubbed "labor migrants." Most moved, often illegally and with few skills, to escape poverty in their own lands, drawn by an awareness of Western prosperity and a belief that a better future awaited them in the developed countries. By 2003, some 4 million Filipino domestic workers were employed in 130 coun-
tries. Young women by the hundreds of thousands from poor countries have been recruited as sex workers in wealthier nations, sometimes in conditions approaching slavery. Smaller numbers of highly skilled and university-trained people, such as doctors and computer scientists, have migrated to seek professional opportunities less available in their own countries. All of this represented a kind of reverse “development aid”—as either cheap labor or intellectual resources—from poor countries to rich. Still other peoples moved as refugees, fleeing violence or political oppression in places such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Sudan, Uganda, Cuba, and Haiti.

Many of those people in motion were headed for the United States, drawn by its reputation for wealth and opportunity. In the forty years between 1971 and 2010, almost 20 million immigrants arrived in the United States legally, and millions more entered illegally, the vast majority of both from the Latin American/Caribbean region and from Asia. Mexicans have been by far the largest group of immigrants to the United States, and many have arrived without legal documentation, an estimated 6.65 million during the first decade of the twenty-first century alone. Often their journeys north have been dangerous as they confronted long treks through burning deserts, sought to evade American immigration authorities, and depended on the expensive and sometimes unreliable “coyotes” who facilitated the smuggling of people across the border. Once in the United States, many of these immigrants provided inexpensive manual labor in fields, factories, and homes of the well-to-do, even as the money they sent back to their families in Mexico represented that nation’s largest source of foreign exchange. The presence of migrants from the Global South has prompted considerable cultural and political conflict in both the United States and Europe, illustrated by a prolonged controversy about the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls in French public schools.

**Growth, Instability, and Inequality**

The impact of these tightening economic links has provoked enormous debate and controversy. Amid the swirl of contending opinion, one thing seemed reasonably clear: economic globalization accompanied, and arguably helped generate, the most remarkable spurt of economic growth in world history. On a global level, total world output grew from a value of $7 trillion in 1950 to $73 trillion in 2009 and on a per capita basis from $2,652 to $10,728. This represents an immense, rapid, and unprecedented creation of wealth with a demonstrable impact on human welfare. Life expectancies expanded almost everywhere, infant mortality declined, and literacy increased. The UN Human Development Report in 1997 concluded that “in the past 50 years, poverty has fallen more than in the previous 500.”

Far more problematic have been the instability of this emerging world economy and the distribution of the wealth it has generated. Amid overall economic growth, periodic crises and setbacks have shaped recent world history. Soaring oil prices contributed to a severe stock market crash in 1973–1974 and great hardship for many developing countries. Inability to repay mounting debts triggered a major...
financial crisis in Latin America during the 1980s and resulted in a “lost decade” in terms of economic development. Another financial crisis in Asia during the late 1990s resulted in the collapse of many businesses, widespread unemployment, and political upheaval in Indonesia and Thailand.

But nothing since the Great Depression more clearly illustrated the unsettling consequences of global connectedness in the absence of global regulation than the worldwide economic contraction that began in 2008. An inflated housing market—or “bubble”—in the United States collapsed, triggering millions of home foreclosures, growing unemployment, the tightening of credit, and declining consumer spending. Soon this crisis rippled around the world. Iceland’s rapidly growing economy collapsed almost overnight as three major banks failed, the country’s stock market dropped by 80 percent, and its currency lost more than 70 percent of its value—all in a single week. In Africa, reduced demand for exports threatened to halt a promising decade of economic progress. In Sierra Leone, for example, some 90 percent of the country’s diamond-mine workers lost their jobs. The slowing of China’s booming economy led to unemployment for one in seven of the country’s urban migrants, forcing them to return to already-overcrowded rural areas. Impoverished Central American and Caribbean families, dependent on money sent home by family members working abroad, suffered further as those remittances dropped sharply. Contracting economies contributed to debt crises in Greece, Italy, and Spain and threatened to unravel European economic integration. Calls for both protectionism and greater regulation suggested that the wide-open capitalist world economy of recent decades was perhaps not as inevitable as some had thought. Whatever the overall benefits of the modern global system, economic stability and steady progress were not among them.

Nor was equality. As Europe’s Industrial Revolution began to take hold in the early nineteenth century, a wholly new division appeared within the human community—between the rich industrialized countries, primarily in Europe and North America, and everyone else. In 1820, the ratio between the income of the top and bottom 20 percent of the world’s population was three to one. By 1991, it was eighty-six to one.5 The accelerated economic globalization of the twentieth century did not create this global rift, but it arguably has worsened the North/South gap and certainly has not greatly diminished it. Even the well-known capitalist financier and investor George Soros, a billionaire many times over, acknowledged this reality in 2000: “The global capitalist system has produced a very uneven playing field. The gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider.”6 That gap has been evident, often tragically, in great disparities in incomes, medical care, availability of clean drinking water, educational and employment opportunities, access to the Internet, and dozens of other ways. It has shaped the life chances of practically everyone. (See Snapshot, opposite.)

These disparities were the foundations for a new kind of global conflict. As the East/West division of capitalism and communism faded, differences between the rich nations of the Global North and the developing countries of the Global South
SNAPSHOT  Global Development and Inequality, 2011

This table shows thirteen commonly used indicators of "development" and their variations in 2011 across four major groups of countries defined by average level of per capita income. In which areas has the Global South most nearly caught up with the Global North?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross National Income per Capita with Sample Countries</th>
<th>Low Income: $995 or Less (Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Myanmar)</th>
<th>Lower Middle Income: $996–$3,945 (India, China, Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria)</th>
<th>Upper Middle Income: $3,946–$12,195 (Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Russia, Iran)</th>
<th>Upper Income: $12,196 or More (USA, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy M/F in years</td>
<td>58/60</td>
<td>66/70</td>
<td>68/75</td>
<td>77/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths under age 5 per 1,000 live births</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths from infectious disease: %</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to toilets: %</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate: %</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth: %</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population: %</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell phones per 100 people</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users per 100 people</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal computers per 100 people</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars per 1,000 people</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td>435.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon dioxide emissions: metric tons per capita</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

assumed greater prominence in world affairs. Highly contentious issues have included the rules for world trade, availability of and terms for foreign aid, representation in international economic organizations, the mounting problem of indebtedness, and environmental and labor standards. Such matters surfaced repeatedly in international negotiations during the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. In the 1970s, for example, a large group of developing countries joined
together to demand a “new international economic order” that was more favorable to the poor countries. Not much success attended this effort. More recently, developing countries have contested protectionist restrictions on their agricultural exports imposed by rich countries seeking to protect their own politically powerful farmers.

Beyond active resistance by the rich nations, a further obstacle to reforming the world economy in favor of the poor lay in growing disparities among the developing countries themselves. The oil-rich economies of the Middle East had little in common with the banana-producing countries of Central America. The rapidly industrializing states of China, India, and South Korea had quite different economic agendas than impoverished African countries. Such disparities made common action difficult to achieve.

Economic globalization has contributed to inequalities not only at the global level and among developing countries but also within individual nations, rich and poor alike. In the United States, for example, a shifting global division of labor required the American economy to shed millions of manufacturing jobs. With recent U.S. factory wages far higher than those of China, many companies moved their manufacturing operations offshore to Asia or Latin America. This left many relatively unskilled American workers in the lurch, forcing them to work in the low-wage service sector, even as other Americans were growing prosperous in emerging high-tech industries. Even some highly skilled work, such as computer programming, was outsourced to lower-wage sites in India, Ireland, Russia, and elsewhere. Mounting income inequality and the erosion of the country’s middle class became major issues in American political debate.

Globalization divided Mexico as well. The northern part of the country, with close business and manufacturing ties to the United States, grew much more prosperous than the south, which was a largely rural agricultural area and had a far more slowly growing economy. Beginning in 1994, southern resentment boiled over in the Chiapas rebellion, which featured a strong anti-globalization platform. Its leader, known as Subcomandante Marcos, referred to globalization as a “process to eliminate that multitude of people who are not useful to the powerful.” China’s rapid economic growth likewise fostered mounting inequality between its rural households and those in its burgeoning cities, where income by 2000 was three times that of the countryside. Economic globalization may have brought people together as never before, but it also divided them sharply.

The hardships and grievances of those left behind or threatened by the march toward economic integration have fueled a growing popular movement aimed at criticizing and counteracting globalization. Known variously as an anti-globalization, alternative globalization, or global justice movement, it emerged in the 1990s as an international coalition of political activists, concerned scholars and students, trade unions, women’s and religious organizations, environmental groups, and others, hailing from rich and poor countries alike. Thus opposition to neoliberal globalization was itself global in scope. Though reflecting a variety of viewpoints, that
opposition largely agreed that free trade and market-driven corporate globalization had lowered labor standards, fostered ecological degradation, prevented poor countries from protecting themselves against financial speculators, ignored local cultures, disregarded human rights, and enhanced global inequality, while favoring the interests of large corporations and the rich countries.

This movement appeared dramatically on the world’s radar screen in late 1999 in Seattle at a meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). An international body representing 149 nations and charged with negotiating the rules for global commerce and promoting free trade, the WTO had become a major target of globalization critics. “The central idea of the WTO,” argued one such critic, “is that free trade—actually the values and interests of global corporations—should supersede all other values.” Ten thousands of protesters—academics, activists, farmers, labor union leaders from all over the world—descended on Seattle in what became a violent, chaotic, and much-publicized protest. At the city’s harbor, protest organizers created a Seattle Tea Party around the slogan “No globalization without representation,” echoing the Boston Tea Party of 1773. Subsequent meetings of the WTO and other high-level international economic gatherings were likewise greeted with large-scale protests and a heavy police presence. In 2001, alternative globalization activists created the World Social Forum, an annual gathering to coordinate strategy, exchange ideas, and share experiences, under the slogan “Another world is possible.” It was an effort to demonstrate that neoliberal globalization was not inevitable and that the processes of a globalized economy could and should be regulated and subjected to public accountability. (See Working with Evidence, Source 23.3, page 1068.)

**Globalization and an American Empire**

For many people, opposition to this kind of globalization also expressed resistance to mounting American power and influence in the world. An “American Empire,” some have argued, is the face of globalization (see Map 23.2), but scholars, commentators, and politicians have disagreed about how best to describe the United States’ role in the postwar world. Certainly it has not been a colonial territorial empire such as that of the British or the French in the nineteenth century. Seeking to distinguish themselves from Europeans, Americans generally have vigorously denied that they have an empire at all.

In some ways, the U.S. global presence might be seen as an “informal empire,” similar to the ones that Europeans exercised in China and the Middle East during the nineteenth century. In both cases, dominant powers sought to use economic penetration, political pressure, and periodic military action to create societies and governments compatible with their values and interests, but without directly governing large populations for long periods. In its economic dimension, American dominance has been termed an “empire of production,” which uses its immense wealth to entice or intimidate potential collaborators. Some scholars have emphasized the...
Those who argue that the United States constructed an empire in the second half of the twentieth century point both to its political/military alliances and interventions around the world and to U.S. economic and cultural penetration of many countries. The distribution of U.S. military bases, a partial indication of its open and covert interventions, and the location of McDonald’s restaurants indicate something of the scope of America’s global presence in the early twenty-first century.
United States’ frequent use of force around the world, while others have focused attention on the “soft power” of its cultural attractiveness, its political and cultural freedoms, the economic benefits of cooperation, and the general willingness of many to follow the American lead voluntarily.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war by the early 1990s, U.S. military dominance was unchecked by any equivalent power. When the United States was attacked by Islamic militants on September 11, 2001, that power was unleashed first against Afghanistan (2001), which had sheltered the al-Qaeda instigators of that attack, and then against Iraq (2003), where Saddam Hussein allegedly had been developing weapons of mass destruction. In the absence of the Soviet Union, the United States could act unilaterally without fear of triggering a conflict with another major power. Although the Afghan and Iraqi regimes were quickly defeated, establishing a lasting peace and rebuilding badly damaged Muslim countries have proved difficult tasks. Thus, within a decade of the Soviet collapse, the United States found itself in yet another global struggle, an effort to contain or eliminate Islamic “terrorism.”

Since the 1980s, as its relative military strength has peaked, the United States has faced growing international economic competition. The recovery of Europe and Japan and the emergent industrialization of South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India substantially reduced the United States’ share of overall world production from about 50 percent in 1945 to 20 percent in the 1980s. By 2008 the United States accounted for just 8.1 percent of world merchandise exports. Accompanying this relative decline was a sharp reversal of the country’s trade balance as U.S. imports greatly exceeded its exports. In 2014 the World Bank reported that China had overtaken the United States as the world’s largest economy, even as it held much of the mounting American national debt.

However it might be defined, the exercise of American power, like that of many empires, was resisted abroad and contested at home. In Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, armed struggle against U.S. intervention was both costly and painful. During the cold war, the governments of India, Egypt, and Ethiopia sought to diminish American influence in their affairs by turning to the Soviet Union or playing off the two superpowers against each other. Even France, resenting U.S. domination, withdrew from the military structure of NATO in 1967 and expelled all foreign–controlled troops from the country. In 2014, Russia strongly expressed its opposition to Western efforts to incorporate former Soviet territories or dependencies into NATO or the European Union by seizing Crimea and pressuring Ukraine to remain within the Russian sphere of influence. Many intellectuals, fearing the erosion of their own cultures in the face of well-financed American media around the world, have decried American “cultural imperialism.” By the early twenty-first century, the United States’ international policies—such as its refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; its refusal to ratify the Kyoto protocol on global warming; its doctrine of preemptive war, which was exercised in Iraq; and its apparent use of torture—had generated widespread opposition.
Within the United States as well, the global exercise of American power generated controversy. The Vietnam War, for example, divided the United States more sharply than at any time since the Civil War. It split families and friendships, churches and political parties. The war provided a platform for a growing number of critics, both at home and abroad, who had come to resent American cultural and economic dominance in the post-1945 world. It stimulated a new sense of activism among students in the nation’s colleges and universities. Many of them came to see America itself as an imperialist power. A similar set of issues, protests, and controversies followed the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The Globalization of Liberation: Focus on Feminism

More than goods, money, and people traversed the planet during the most recent century. So too did ideas, and none was more powerful than that of liberation. Communism promised workers and peasants liberation from capitalist oppression. Nationalism offered subject peoples liberation from imperialism. Advocates of democracy sought liberation from authoritarian governments.

The 1960s in particular witnessed an unusual convergence of protest movements around the world, suggesting the emergence of a global culture of liberation. Within the United States, several such movements—the civil rights demands of African Americans and Hispanic Americans; the youthful counterculture of rock music, sex, and drugs; the prolonged and highly divisive protests against the war in Vietnam—gave the 1960s a distinctive place in the country’s recent history. Across the Atlantic, swelling protests against unresponsive bureaucracy, consumerism, and middle-class values likewise erupted, most notably in France in 1968. There a student-led movement protesting conditions in universities attracted the support of many middle-class people, who were horrified at the brutality of the police, and stimulated an enormous strike among some 9 million workers. France seemed on the edge of another revolution. Related but smaller-scale movements took place in Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, and elsewhere.

The communist world too was rocked by protest. In 1968, a new Communist Party leadership in Czechoslovakia, led by Alexander Dubcek, initiated a sweeping series of reforms aimed at creating “socialism with a human face.” Censorship ended, generating an explosion of free expression in what had been a highly repressive regime; unofficial political clubs emerged publicly; victims of earlier repression were rehabilitated; secret ballots for party elections were put in place. To the conservative leaders of the Soviet Union, this “Prague Spring” seemed to challenge communist rule itself, and they sent troops and tanks to crush it. Across the world in communist China, another kind of protest was taking shape in that country’s Cultural Revolution (see Chapter 21, page 945).

In the developing countries, a substantial number of political leaders, activists, scholars, and students developed the notion of a “third world.” Their countries, many only recently free from colonial rule, would offer an alternative to both a
decrepit Western capitalism and a repressive Soviet communism. They claimed to pioneer new forms of economic development, of grassroots democracy, and of cultural renewal. By the late 1960s, the icon of this third-world ideology was Che Guevara, the Argentine-born revolutionary who had embraced the Cuban Revolution and subsequently attempted to replicate its experience of liberation through guerrilla warfare in parts of Africa and Latin America. Various aspects of his life story—his fervent anti-imperialism, cast as a global struggle; his self-sacrificing lifestyle; his death in 1967 at the hands of the Bolivian military, trained and backed by the American CIA—made him a heroic figure to third-world revolutionaries. He was popular as well among Western radicals, who were disgusted with the complacency and materialism of their own societies.

No expression of this global culture of liberation held a more profound potential for change than feminism, for it represented a rethinking of the most fundamental and personal of all human relationships—that between women and men. Feminism had begun in the West in the nineteenth century with a primary focus on suffrage and in several countries had achieved the status of a mass movement by the outbreak of World War I (see Chapter 16, pages 723–27). The twentieth century, however, witnessed the globalization of feminism as organized efforts to address the concerns of women took shape across the world. Communist governments—in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, for example—mounted vigorous efforts to gain the support of women and to bring them into the workforce by attacking major elements of older patriarchies (see Chapter 21, pages 940–42). But feminism took hold in many cultural and political settings, where women confronted different issues, adopted different strategies, and experienced a range of outcomes.

Feminism in the West

In the West, organized feminism had lost momentum by the end of the 1920s, when many countries in Western Europe and North America had achieved women's suffrage. When it revived in the 1960s in both Western Europe and the United States, it did so with a quite different agenda. In France, for example, the writer and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir in 1949 had published The Second Sex, a book arguing that women had historically been defined as “other,” or deviant from the
“normal” male sex. The book soon became a central statement of a reviving women’s movement. French feminists staged a counter-Mother’s Day parade under the slogan “Celebrated one day; exploited all year.” To highlight their demand to control their own bodies, some 343 women signed a published manifesto stating that they had undergone an abortion, which was then illegal in France.

Across the Atlantic, millions of American women responded to Betty Friedan’s book *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), which disclosed the identity crisis of educated women, unfulfilled by marriage and motherhood. Some adherents of this second-wave feminism took up the equal rights agenda of their nineteenth-century predecessors, but with an emphasis now on employment and education rather than voting rights. A more radical expression of American feminism, widely known as “women’s liberation,” took broader aim at patriarchy as a system of domination, similar to those of race and class. One manifesto from 1969 declared:

> We are exploited as sex objects, breeders, domestic servants, and cheap labor. We are considered inferior beings, whose only purpose is to enhance men’s lives. . . . Because we live so intimately with our oppressors, we have been kept from seeing our personal suffering as a political condition.11

Thus liberation for women meant becoming aware of their own oppression, a process that took place in thousands of consciousness-raising groups across the country. Many such women advocated direct action rather than the political lobbying favored by equal rights feminists. They challenged the Miss America contest of 1968 by tossing stink bombs in the hall, crowning a live sheep as their Miss America, and disposing of girdles, bras, high-heeled shoes, tweezers, and other “instruments of oppression” in a Freedom Trashcan. They also brought into open discussion issues involving sexuality, insisting that free love, lesbianism, and celibacy should be accorded the same respect as heterosexual marriage.

Yet another strand of Western feminism emerged from women of color. For many of them, the concerns of white, usually middle-class, feminists were hardly relevant to their oppression. Black women had always worked outside the home and so felt little need to be liberated from the chains of homemaking. Whereas white women might find the family oppressive, African American women viewed it as a secure base from which to resist racism. Solidarity with black men, rather than separation from them, was essential in confronting a racist America. Viewing mainstream feminism as “a family quarrel between White women and White men,” many women of African descent in the United States and Britain established their own organizations, with a focus on racism and poverty.12

**Feminism in the Global South**

As women mobilized outside of the Western world during the twentieth century, they faced very different situations than did white women in the United States and Europe. For much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the predominant issues—
colonialism, racism, national independence, poverty, development, political oppression, and sometimes revolution—were not directly related to gender. Women were affected by and engaged with all of these efforts and were welcomed by nationalist and communist leaders, mostly men, who needed their support. But once independence or the revolution was achieved, the women who had joined those movements often were relegated to marginal positions.

The different conditions within developing countries sometimes generated sharp criticism of Western feminism. To many African feminists in the 1970s and later, the concerns of their American or European sisters were too individualistic, too focused on sexuality, and insufficiently concerned with issues of motherhood, marriage, and poverty to be of much use. Furthermore, they resented Western feminists’ insistent interest in cultural matters such as female genital mutilation and polygamy, which sometimes echoed the concerns of colonial-era missionaries and administrators. Western feminism could easily be seen as a new form of cultural imperialism. Moreover, many African governments and many African men defined feminism of any kind as “un-African” and associated with a hated colonialism.

Women’s movements in the Global South took shape around a wide range of issues, not all of which were explicitly gender based. In the East African country of Kenya, a major form of mobilization was the women’s group movement. Some 27,000 small associations of women, an outgrowth of traditional self-help groups, had a combined membership of more than a million by the late 1980s. Members provided support for one another during times of need, such as weddings, births, and funerals, and took on community projects, such as building water cisterns, schools, and dispensaries. In one province, for example, women’s groups focused on providing permanent iron roofing for homes. Some groups became revolving loan societies or bought land or businesses. One woman testified to the sense of empowerment she derived from membership in her group:

I am a free woman. I bought this piece of land through my group. I can lie on it, work on it, keep goats or cows. What more do I want? My husband cannot sell it. It is mine.13

Elsewhere, other issues and approaches predominated. In the North African Islamic kingdom of Morocco, a more centrally directed and nationally focused feminist movement targeted the country’s Family Law Code, which still defined women as minors. In 2004, a long campaign by Morocco’s feminist movement, often with the help of supportive men and a liberal king, resulted in a new Family Law Code, which recognized women as equals to their husbands and allowed them to initiate divorce and to claim child custody, all of which had previously been denied.

In Chile, a women’s movement emerged as part of a national struggle against the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, who ruled the country from 1973 to 1990. Because they were largely regarded as “invisible” in the public sphere, women were able to organize extensively, despite the repression of the Pinochet regime. From this explosion of organizing activity emerged a women’s movement
that crossed class lines and party affiliations. Human rights activists, most of them women, called attention to the widespread use of torture and to the “disappearance” of thousands of opponents of the regime, while demanding the restoration of democracy. Poor urban women by the tens of thousands organized soup kitchens, craft workshops, and shopping collectives, all aimed at the economic survival of their families. Smaller numbers of middle-class women brought more distinctly feminist perspectives to the movement and argued pointedly for “democracy in the country and in the home.” This diverse women’s movement was an important part of the larger national protest that returned Chile to democratic government in 1990.

**International Feminism**

Perhaps the most impressive achievement of feminism in the twentieth century was its ability to project the “woman question” as a global issue and to gain international recognition for the view that “women’s rights are human rights.” Like slavery and empire before it, patriarchy lost at least some of its legitimacy during this most recent century, although clearly it has not been vanquished.

Feminism registered as a global issue when the United Nations (UN), under pressure from women activists, declared 1975 as International Women’s Year and the next ten years as the Decade for Women. The UN also sponsored a series of World Conferences on Women over the next twenty years. By 2006, 183 nations, though not the United States, had ratified a UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which committed them to promote women’s legal equality, to end discrimination, to actively encourage women’s development, and to protect women’s human rights. Clearly, this international attention to women’s issues was encouraging to feminists operating in their own countries and in many places stimulated both research and action.

This growing international spotlight on women’s issues also revealed sharp divisions within global feminism. One issue was determining who had the right to speak on behalf of women at international gatherings—the official delegates of male-dominated governments or the often more radical unofficial participants representing various nongovernmental organizations. North/South conflicts also surfaced at these international conferences. In preparing for the Mexico City gathering in 1975, the United States attempted to limit the agenda to matters of political and civil rights for women, whereas delegates from third-world and communist countries wanted to include issues of economic justice, decolonization, and disarmament. Feminists from the South resented the dominance and contested the ideas of their Northern sisters. One African group highlighted the differences:

While patriarchal views and structures oppress women all over the world, women are also members of classes and countries that dominate others and enjoy privileges in terms of access to resources. Hence, contrary to the best intentions of “sisterhood,” not all women share identical interests.14


An Aspect of Brazilian Feminism

Protesting macho culture and violence against women, demonstrations in São Paulo, Brazil, began in 2011, challenging the assumption that female victims of rape were responsible for those attacks because of how they dressed. Participants marched as “sluts,” wearing sexually provocative clothing, while urging the “transformation of the world by feminism.” The “slutwalk” shown here took place in São Paulo in mid-2014. (© Aaron Cedeño/Agência Corbix)

Nor did all third-world groups have identical views. Some Muslim delegates at the Beijing Conference in 1995 opposed a call for equal inheritance for women because Islamic law required that sons receive twice the amount that daughters inherit. In contrast, Africans, especially in non-Muslim countries, were aware of how many children had been orphaned by AIDS and felt that girls’ chances for survival depended on equal inheritance.

Finally, beyond such divisions within international feminism lay a global backlash among those who felt that its radical agenda had undermined family life, the proper relationship of men and women, and civilization generally. To Phyllis Schlafly, a prominent American opponent of the Equal Rights Amendment, feminism was a “disease” that brought in its wake “fear, sickness, pain, anger, hatred, danger, violence, and all manner of ugliness.” In the Islamic world, Western-style feminism, with its claims of gender equality and open sexuality, was highly offensive to many and fueled movements of religious revivalism that invited or compelled women to wear the veil and sometimes to lead highly restricted lives. The Vatican, some Catholic and Muslim countries, and at times the U.S. government took strong exception to aspects of global feminism, particularly its emphasis on reproductive rights, including access to abortion and birth control. Thus feminism was global as the twenty-first century dawned, but it was very diverse and much contested.
Religion and Global Modernity

Beyond liberation and feminism, a further dimension of cultural globalization took shape in the challenge that modernity presented to the world's religions. To the most "advanced" thinkers of the past several hundred years—Enlightenment writers in the eighteenth century, Karl Marx in the nineteenth, and many academics and secular-minded intellectuals in the twentieth—religion was headed for extinction in the face of modernity, science, communism, or globalization. In some places—Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union, for example—religious belief and practice had declined sharply. Moreover, the spread of a scientific culture around the world persuaded small minorities everywhere, often among the most highly educated, that the only realities worth considering were those that could be measured with the techniques of science. To such people, all else was superstition, born of ignorance. Nevertheless, the far more prominent trends of the last century have been those that involved the further spread of major world religions, their resurgence in new forms, their opposition to elements of a secular and global modernity, and their political role as a source of community identity and conflict. Contrary to earlier expectations, religion has played an unexpectedly powerful role in this most recent century.

Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam had long functioned as transregional cultures, spreading far beyond their places of origin. That process continued in the twentieth century. Buddhist ideas and practices such as meditation found a warm reception in the West, as did yoga, originally a mind-body practice of Indian origin. Christianity of various kinds spread widely in non-Muslim Africa and South Korea and less extensively in parts of India. By the end of the twentieth century, it was growing even in China, where perhaps 7 to 8 percent of China's population—some 84 to 96 million people—claimed allegiance to the faith. No longer a primarily European or North American religion, Christianity by the early twenty-first century found some 62 percent of its adherents in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America. In some instances, missionaries from those regions have set about the "re-evangelization" of Europe and North America. Moreover, millions of migrants from the Islamic world have planted their religion solidly in the West. In the United States, for example, a substantial number of African Americans and smaller numbers of European Americans engage in Islamic practice. For several decades, the writings of the thirteenth-century Islamic Sufi poet Rumi have been best sellers in the United States. Religious exchange, in short, has been a two-way street, not simply a transmission of Western ideas to the rest of the world. More than ever before, religious pluralism characterizes many of the world's societies, confronting people with the need to make choices in a domain of life previously regarded as given and fixed.
Fundamentalism on a Global Scale

Religious vitality in the twentieth century was expressed not only in the spread of particular traditions to new areas but also in the vigorous response of those traditions to the modernizing and globalizing world in which they found themselves. One such response has been widely called “fundamentalism,” a militant piety—defensive, assertive, and exclusive—that took shape to some extent in every major religious tradition. Many features of the modern world, after all, appeared threatening to established religion. The scientific and secular focus of global modernity challenged the core beliefs of religion, with its focus on an unseen realm of reality. Furthermore, the social upheavals connected with capitalism, industrialization, and globalization thoroughly upset customary class, family, and gender relationships that had long been sanctified by religious tradition. Nation-states, often associated with particular religions, were likewise undermined by the operation of a global economy and challenged by the spread of alien cultures. In much of the world, these disruptions came at the hands of foreigners, usually Westerners, in the form of military defeat, colonial rule, economic dependency, and cultural intrusion.

To such threats, fundamentalism represented a religious response, characterized by one scholar as “embattled forms of spirituality . . . experienced as a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil.”

Although fundamentalisms everywhere looked to the past for ideals and models, their rejection of modernity was selective, not wholesale. What they sought was an alternative modernity, infused with particular religious values. Most, in fact, made active use of modern technology to communicate their message and certainly sought the potential prosperity associated with modern life. Extensive educational and propaganda efforts, political mobilization of their followers, social welfare programs, and sometimes violence (“terrorism” to their opponents) were among the means that fundamentalists employed.

The term “fundamentalism” derived from the United States, where religious conservatives in the early twentieth century were outraged by critical and “scientific” approaches to the Bible, by Darwinian evolution, and by liberal versions of Christianity that accommodated these heresies. They called for a return to the “fundamentals” of the faith, which included a belief in the literal truthfulness of the scriptures, in the virgin birth and physical resurrection of Jesus, and in miracles. After World War II, American Protestant fundamentalism came to oppose political liberalism and “big government,” the sexual revolution of the 1960s, homosexuality and abortion rights, and secular humanism generally. Many fundamentalists saw the United States on the edge of an abyss. For one major spokesman, Francis Schaeffer (1912–1984), the West was about to enter “an electronic dark age, in which the new pagan hordes, with all the power of technology at their command, are on the verge of obliterating the last strongholds of civilized humanity.” He declared, “A vision of darkness lies before us. As we leave the shores of Christian Western man behind, only a dark and turbulent sea of despair stretches endlessly ahead . . . unless we fight.”
And fight they did! At first, fundamentalists sought to separate themselves from the secular world in their own churches and schools, but from the 1970s on, entered the political arena as the “religious right,” determined to return America to a “godly path.” “We have enough votes to run this country,” declared Pat Robertson, a major fundamentalist evangelist and broadcaster who ran for president in 1988. Conservative Christians, no longer willing to restrict their attention to personal salvation, had emerged as a significant force in American political life well before the end of the century.

In the very different setting of independent India, another fundamentalist movement—known as Hindutva (Hindu nationalism)—took shape during the 1980s, although the concept had appeared as early as 1923 and Gandhi’s assassination in 1948 had occurred at the hands of men in that movement. Like American fundamentalism, it represented a politicization of religion within a democratic context. To its advocates, India was, and always had been, an essentially Hindu land, even though it had been overwhelmed in recent centuries by Muslim invaders, then by the Christian British, and most recently by the secular state of the post-independence decades. The leaders of modern India, they argued, and particularly its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, were “the self-proclaimed secularists who . . . seek to remake India in the Western image,” while repudiating its basically Hindu religious character. The Hindutva movement took political shape in an increasingly popular party called the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with much of its support coming from urban middle-class or upper-caste people who resented the state’s efforts to cater to the interests of Muslims, Sikhs, and the lower castes. Muslims in particular were defined as outsiders, potentially more loyal to a Muslim Pakistan than to India. The BJP became a major political force in India during the 1980s, winning a number of elections and promoting a distinctly Hindu identity in education, culture, and religion. Its sweeping victory in national elections in 2014 raised questions about how its Hindu nationalism would fare in twenty-first-century India.

Creating Islamic Societies: Resistance and Renewal in the World of Islam

The most prominent of the late twentieth-century fundamentalisms was surely that of Islam. Expressed in many and various ways, it was an effort among growing numbers of Muslims to renew and reform the practice of Islam and to create a new religious/political order centered on a particular understanding of their faith. Earlier renewal movements, such as the eighteenth-century Wahhabis (see pages 660–61) focused largely on the internal problems of Muslim societies, while those of the twentieth century responded as well to the external pressures of colonial rule, Western imperialism, and secular modernity.

Emerging strongly in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Islamic renewal movements gained strength from the enormous disappointments that had accumu-
lated in the Muslim world by the 1970s. Conquest and colonial rule; awareness of the huge technological and economic gap between Islamic and European civilizations; the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, long the chief Islamic state; elite enchantment with Western culture; the retreat of Islam for many to the realm of private life—all of this had sapped the cultural self-confidence of many Muslims by the mid-twentieth century. Political independence for former colonies certainly represented a victory for Islamic societies, but it had given rise to major states—Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Algeria, and others—that pursued essentially Western and secular policies of nationalism, socialism, and economic development, often with only lip service to an Islamic identity.

Even worse, these policies were not very successful. A number of endemic problems—vastly overcrowded cities with few services, widespread unemployment, pervasive corruption, slow economic growth, a mounting gap between the rich and poor—flew in the face of the great expectations that had accompanied the struggle against European domination. Despite formal independence, foreign intrusion still persisted. Israel, widely regarded as an outpost of the West, had been reestablished as a Jewish state in the very center of the Islamic world in 1948. In 1967, Israel inflicted a devastating defeat on Arab forces in the Six-Day War and seized various Arab territories, including the holy city of Jerusalem. Furthermore, broader signs of Western cultural penetration persisted—secular schools, alcohol, Barbie dolls, European and American movies, scantily clad women. (For more on Muslim views on Barbie dolls, see Zooming In: Barbie and Her Competitors in the Muslim World, page 1046.) The largely secular leader of independent Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, argued against the veil for women as well as polygamy for men and discouraged his people from fasting during Ramadan. In 1960, he was shown on television drinking orange juice during the sacred month to the outrage of many traditional Muslims.

This was the context in which the idea of an Islamic alternative to Western models of modernity began to take hold more broadly, although its origins go back to the Young Ottomans of the 1860s. The intellectual and political foundations of this Islamic renewal had been established earlier in the century. Its leading figures, such as the Indian Mawlawi Mawdudi and the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, insisted that the Quran and the sharia (Islamic law) provided a guide for all of life—political, economic, and spiritual—and a blueprint for a distinctly Islamic modernity not dependent on Western ideas. It was the departure from Islamic principles, they argued, that had led the Islamic world into decline and subordination to the West, and only a return to the “straight path of Islam” would ensure a revival of Muslim societies. That effort to return to Islamic principles was labeled jihad, an ancient and evocative religious term that refers to “struggle” or “striving” to please God. In its twentieth-century political expression, jihad included the defense of an authentic Islam against Western aggression and vigorous efforts to achieve the Islamization of social and political life within Muslim countries. It was a posture that would enable Muslims to resist the seductive but poisonous culture of the West. Sayyid Qutb had
"I think every Barbie doll is more harmful than an American missile," declared Iranian toy seller Masoumeh Rahimi in 2002. To Rahimi, Barbie’s revealing clothing, her shapely appearance, and her close association with Ken, her longtime unmarried companion, were "foreign to Iran’s culture." Thus Rahimi warmly welcomed the arrival in 2002 of Sara and Dara, Iranian Muslim dolls meant to counteract the negative influence of Barbie, who had long dominated Iran’s toy market. Created by the Iranian government, Sara and her brother, Dara, represented eight-year-old twins and were intended to replace Barbie and Ken, the sale of which the authorities had officially banned in the mid-1990s because they represented a "Trojan horse" for Western values. Sara came complete with a headscarf to cover her hair in modest Muslim fashion and a full-length white chador enveloping her from head to toe. She and her brother were described as helping each other solve problems, while looking to their loving parents for guidance, hardly the message that Barbie and Ken conveyed.18

In 2003, a toy company based in Syria introduced Fulla, a doll depicting a young Muslim woman about the same age as Barbie, perhaps a grown-up version of Sara. Dressed modestly in a manner that reflected the norms of each national market, Fulla was described by her creator as representing "Muslim values." Unlike Barbie, with her boyfriend and a remarkable range of careers, including astronaut and president of the United States, Fulla was modeled on the ideal traditional Arab woman. She interacted with male family members rather than a boyfriend and was depicted only as a teacher or a doctor, both respected professions for women in the Islamic world. But she did share an eye for fashion with Barbie. Underneath her full-length white chador, Fulla was depicted wearing a typical feminine white outfit. Under her headscarf, Fulla sported "modern" features such as long hair, bright makeup, and stylish clothing.

A Syrian girl examining Fulla dolls at a toy store in Damascus in 2005.

Guided Reading Question

COMPARISON

In what different ways did Islamic renewal express itself?

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Witnessed that culture during a visit to the United States in the late 1940s and was appalled by what he saw:

Look at this capitalism with its monopolies, its usury . . . at this individual freedom, devoid of human sympathy and responsibility for relatives except under force of law; at this materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit; at this behavior like animals which you call "free mixing of the sexes"; at this vulgarity which you call "emancipation of women"; at this evil and fanatical racial discrimination.19

By the 1970s, ideas and organizations favoring the Islamization of public life echoed widely across the Islamic world and found expression in many ways. At the level of personal practice, many people became more religiously observant, attending mosque, praying regularly, and fasting. Substantial numbers of women, many...
modest outer dress, Fulla wore stylish clothing, although it was less revealing than that of her American counterpart, and, like Barbie, she chose from an extensive wardrobe, sold separately of course. "This isn’t just about putting the hijab [a headscarf covering a woman’s hair and chest] on a Barbie doll," Fawaz Abidin, the Fulla brand manager, noted. "You have to create a character that parents and children want to relate to."

Fulla proved far more popular than Sara among Muslim girls, becoming one of the best-selling dolls in the Muslim world. In part, the adoption by Fulla’s creators of Western marketing techniques, similar to those that had been used to promote Barbie for decades, lay behind the doll’s remarkable success. Fulla-themed magazines appeared on newsstands, and commercials advertising Fulla dolls and their accessories permeated children’s television stations in the Muslim world. “When you take Fulla out of the house, don’t forget her new spring abaya [a long, robe-like full-body covering]!” admonished one advertisement. Fulla’s image was used to market an endless number of other licensed products, including branded stationery, backpacks, prayer rugs, bikes, and breakfast cereals, all in trademark “Fulla pink.” In this respect, Fulla and Barbie shared a great deal. Despite Fulla’s success, Barbie has continued to enjoy a loyal following in the region, in part because of her exotic qualities. “All my friends have Fulla now, but I still like Barbie the best,” one ten-year-old Saudi girl stated. “She has blonde hair and cool clothes. Every single girl in Saudi looks like Fulla. . . . What’s so special about that?”

The widespread availability of Barbie in the Muslim world provides one small example of the power of global commerce in the world of the early twenty-first century. But Sara and Fulla illustrate resistance to the cultural values associated with this American product. Still, Sara, Fulla, and Barbie had something in common: nearly all were manufactured in East Asian factories. Indeed, the same factories frequently manufactured the rival dolls. This triangular relationship of the United States, the Muslim world, and East Asia symbolized the growing integration of world economics and cultures as well as the divergences and conflicts that this process has generated. These linked but contrasting patterns involve much more than dolls in the early twenty-first century, for they define major features of the world we all share.

Questions: What can Barbie, Sara, and Fulla tell us about the globalized world of the twenty-first century? What different values and sensibilities do they convey?

of them young, urban, and well educated, adopted modest Islamic dress and the veil quite voluntarily. Participation in Sufi mystical practices increased in some places. Furthermore, many governments sought to anchor themselves in Islamic rhetoric and practice. During the 1970s, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt claimed the title of “Believer-President,” referred frequently to the Quran, and proudly displayed his “prayer mark,” a callus on his forehead caused by touching his head to the ground in prayer. Under pressure from Islamic activists, the government of Sudan in the 1980s adopted Quranic punishments for various crimes (such as amputating the hand of a thief) and announced a total ban on alcohol, dramatically dumping thousands of bottles of beer and wine into the Nile.

All over the Muslim world, from North Africa to Indonesia (see Map 23.3), Islamic renewal movements spawned organizations that operated legally to provide social services—schools, clinics, youth centers, legal-aid societies, financial
Map 23.3  The Islamic World in the Early Twenty-First Century

An Islamic world of well over a billion people incorporated much of the Afro-Asian landmass but was divided among many nations and along linguistic and ethnic lines as well. The long-term split between the majority Sunnis and the minority Shias also sharpened in the new millennium.

Institutions, publishing houses— that the state offered inadequately or not at all. Islamic activists took leadership roles in unions and professional organizations of teachers, journalists, engineers, doctors, and lawyers. Such people embraced modern science and technology but sought to embed these elements of modernity within a distinctly Islamic culture. Some served in official government positions or entered political life and contested elections where it was possible to do so. The Algerian Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win elections in 1992, when a frightened military government intervened to cancel the elections, an action that plunged the country into a decade of bitter civil war. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood did come to power peacefully in 2012, but was removed by the military a year later amid widespread protests against its policies.

Movements embracing another face of religious renewal, however, sought the forcible overthrow of what they saw as compromised regimes in the Islamic world, most successfully in Iran in 1979 (see Chapter 22, pages 1007–10), but also
in Afghanistan (1996), northern Nigeria (2009–2015), and parts of Syria and Iraq (2013–2015). Here Islamic movements succeeded in seizing state power or controlling certain territories and began to implement, sometimes brutally, a program of Islamization based on the sharia. Elsewhere military governments in Pakistan and Sudan likewise introduced elements of sharia-based law. Hoping to spark an Islamic revolution, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization assassinated President Sadat in 1981, following Sadat’s brutal crackdown on both Islamic and secular opposition groups. One of the leaders of Islamic Jihad explained:

We have to establish the Rule of God’s Religion in our own country first, and to make the Word of God supreme. . . . There is no doubt that the first battlefield for jihad is the extermination of these infidel leaders and to replace them by a complete Islamic Order.21

Islamic revolutionaries also took aim at hostile foreign powers. Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, supported by the Islamic regime in Iran, targeted Israel with popular uprisings, suicide bombings, and rocket attacks in response to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. For some, Israel’s very existence was illegitimate. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted widespread opposition aimed at liberating that country from atheistic communism and creating an Islamic state. Sympathetic Arabs from the Middle East and other Muslims flocked to the aid of their Afghan compatriots.

Among them was the young Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arab, who created an organization, al-Qaeda (meaning “the base” in Arabic), to funnel fighters and funds to the Afghan resistance. At the time, bin Laden and the Americans were on the same side, both opposing Soviet expansion into Afghanistan, but they soon parted ways. Returning to his home in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden became disillusioned and radicalized when the government of his country allowed the stationing of “infidel” U.S. troops in Islam’s holy land, where the faith had begun, during and after the first American war against Iraq in 1991. By the mid-1990s, he had found a safe haven in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, from which he and other leaders of al-Qaeda planned their attack on the World Trade Center and other targets in the United States on September 11, 2001. Although they had no standing as Muslim clerics, in 1998 they had issued a fatwa (religious edict) declaring war on America:

For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. . . . The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the holy mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.22
Hamas in Action
The Palestinian militant organization Hamas, founded in 1987 as an offshoot of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, illustrates two dimensions of Islamic radicalism. On the one hand, Hamas repeatedly sent suicide bombers to target Israeli civilians and sought the elimination of the Israeli state. A group of would-be suicide bombers are shown here in white robes during the funeral of colleagues killed by Israeli security forces in late 2003. On the other hand, Hamas ran a network of social services, providing schools, clinics, orphanages, summer camps, soup kitchens, and libraries for Palestinians. The classroom pictured here from 2006 was part of a school founded by Hamas. (Left: Andrea Comas/ReutersLandov; right: Ahmad Katib/Getty Images)

Elsewhere as well—in East Africa, Indonesia, Great Britain, Spain, France, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—al-Qaeda or groups associated with it launched scattered attacks on Western interests. At the international level, the great enemy was not Christianity itself or even Western civilization, but irreligious Western-style modernity, U.S. imperialism, and the American-led economic globalization so aptly symbolized by the World Trade Center. Ironically, al-Qaeda itself was a modern and global organization, many of whose members were highly educated professionals from a variety of countries.

Despite this focus on the West, the violent struggles undertaken by politicized Islamic activists were directed as much against elements within the Islamic world as they were against the external enemy. Broadly known as Salafis, these activists and their supporters sought to follow what they understood to be the example of the salaf, or “ancestors,” men of Muhammad’s time and shortly thereafter. Their understanding of Islam, heavily influenced by Wahhabi ideas (see pages 660–61), was in various ways quite novel and at odds with classical Islamic practice. It was highly literal and dogmatic in its understanding of the Quran, legalistic in its effort to regulate the minute details of daily life, deeply opposed to any “innovation” in religious practice, inclined to define those who disagreed with them as “non-Muslims,” and drawn to violent jihad as a legitimate part of Islamic life. It was also deeply skeptical about the interior spiritual emphasis of Sufism, which had informed so much of earlier Islamic culture. The spread of Salafi Islam owed much to massive financial backing from oil-rich Saudi Arabia, which funded Wahhabi/Salafi mosques and schools across the Islamic world and in the West as well.
Religious Alternatives to Fundamentalism

Militant revolutionary fundamentalism has certainly not been the only religious response to modernity and globalization within the Islamic world. Many who shared a desire to embed Islamic values more centrally in their societies have acted peacefully and within established political structures. In Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon, Islamic parties with various agendas made impressive electoral showings in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century. Considerable debate among Muslims has raised questions about the proper role of the state, the difference between the eternal law of God (sharia) and the human interpretations of it, the rights of women, the possibility of democracy, and many other issues. (See Working with Evidence: Contending for Islam, Chapter 22, page 1012.) Some Muslim intellectuals and political leaders have called for a dialogue between civilizations; others have argued that traditions can change in the face of modern realities without losing their distinctive Islamic character. In 1996, Anwar Ibrahim, a major political and intellectual figure in Malaysia, insisted:

[Southeast Asian Muslims] would rather strive to improve the welfare of the women and children in their midst than spend their days elaborately defining the nature and institutions of the ideal Islamic state. They do not believe it makes one less of a Muslim to promote economic growth, to master the information revolution, and to demand justice for women.33

In Turkey, a movement inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish Muslim scholar and preacher, has sought to apply the principles of Islamic spirituality and Sufi piety to the problems of modern society. Gaining a mass following in the 1990s and later, the Gulen movement has advocated interfaith and cross-cultural dialogue, multiparty democracy, nonviolence, and modern scientifically based education for girls and boys alike. Operating through schools, universities, conferences, newspapers, radio and TV stations, and various charities, it has a presence in more than 100 countries around the world. Claiming to be “faith-based but not faith limited,” the movement rejects the “fundamentalist” label even as it has challenged a wholly secular outlook on public life. And in 2004–2005, a gathering in Jordan of scholars from all major schools of Islamic thought issued the “Amman Message,” which called for Islamic unity, condemned terrorism, forbade Muslims from declaring one another as “apostate” or nonbelievers, and emphasized the commonalities shared by Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

Within other religious traditions as well, believers found various ways of responding to global modernity. A number of liberal and mainstream Christian groups spoke to the ethical issues arising from economic globalization. Many Christian organizations, for example, were active in agitating for debt relief for poor countries. Pope John Paul II (r. 1978–2005) voiced his concern about “the growing distance between rich and poor, [and] unfair competition which puts the poor nations in a situation of ever-increasing inferiority.” Pope Francis (r. 2013– ), the first pontiff from Latin America, sought even more emphatically to direct the attention of
were they values and expectations?

fundamentalism

ln

How might you compare feminism and fundamentalism as global movements? In what ways did they challenge earlier values and expectations? To what extent were they in conflict with one another?

Experiencing the Anthropocene Era: Environment and Environmentalism

Even as world religions, fundamentalist and otherwise, challenged global modernity on cultural or spiritual grounds, burgeoning environmental movements in the 1960s and later also did so with an eye to the human impact on the earth and its many living creatures, including ourselves. Among the distinctive features of the twentieth century, none has been more pronounced than humankind’s growing ability to alter the natural order and the mounting awareness of this phenomenon. When the wars, revolutions, and empires of this most recent century have faded from memory, environmental transformation and environmental consciousness may well seem to future generations the decisive feature of that century. Already, many scientists and other scholars have begun to refer to the current era, since at least the advent of the Industrial Revolution, as the Anthropocene, or the “age of man.” That informal term has called attention to the lasting impact of human activity on the planet. Species extinctions, increases of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the depletion of groundwater reserves, the enlargement of deserts, dead zones in the oceans, transformation of the landscape as wetlands shrink and urban centers grow—these and other environmental changes, all of them generated by human actions, will be apparent to our descendants thousands of years in the future, should they be around to reflect on them.

The Global Environment Transformed

Underlying the environmental changes of the twentieth century were three factors that vastly magnified the human impact on earth’s ecological systems far beyond anything previously known. One was the explosion of human numbers, an unprec-
edent quadrupling of the world’s population in a single century, leaving the world of 2014 with about 7.2 billion people compared to about 1.6 billion in 1900. It was a demographic revolution born of medical and sanitation advances that dramatically lowered death rates and Green Revolution technologies such as genetically modified seeds and fertilizers that substantially increased world food supplies.

This vast enlargement of the human population meant more consumption and thus more demands on the earth’s resources. It also fostered massive urbanization and global migration, even as it contributed to many political and social upheavals, especially in the second half of the century. By the end of the century, the rate of global population growth had begun to slow. From a peak of over 2 percent per year in the 1960s, it had dropped to 1.14 percent by 2014. This transition had occurred first in the more developed countries, where birth control measures were widely available, women were educated and pursuing careers, and large families were economically burdensome. This pattern began to take hold in developing countries as well, assisted by vigorous family-planning programs in many places, the most dramatic of which was China’s famous “one-child family” policy. Experts predict that the modern population explosion will level off by the mid-twenty-first century at some 9 to 12 billion people, although whether the world economy and its resource base can support these enormously enhanced numbers remains an open question.

A second cause of environmental stress lay in the amazing new ability of humankind to tap the energy potential of fossil fuels—coal in the nineteenth century and oil in the twentieth. These fuels drove the industrialization process everywhere, with coal providing the major source for electricity generation and oil giving rise to the immense automobile industry. Hydroelectricity, natural gas, solar power, and nuclear power added to the energy resources available to our species.

These new sources of energy made possible a third contribution to environmental transformation—phenomenal economic growth—as modern science and technology immensely increased the production of goods and services. Between the 1890s and the 1990s, global industrial output grew by a factor of forty, although very unevenly across the planet. But almost everywhere—in capitalist, communist, and developing countries alike—the idea of economic growth or “development” as something possible and desirable took hold as a novel element of global culture.

These three factors were the foundations for the immense environmental transformations of this most recent century. Human activity had always altered the natural order, usually on a local basis, but now the scale of that impact assumed global and perhaps even geological proportions. The growing numbers of the poor and the growing consumption of the rich led to the doubling of cropland; a corresponding contraction of the world’s forests, wetlands, and grasslands; and dramatic increases in the rate of erosion. Huge urban complexes have transformed the landscape in many places. With diminished habitats, numerous species of plants and animals either disappeared or were threatened with extinction at a rate many times greater than the background level. Certainly, massive species extinctions have occurred much earlier in the history of the planet (the dinosaurs, for example), but this wave of extinctions is happening at the hands of humankind. The human...
remaking of the ecosystem has also greatly increased the presence of plants and animals that have benefited from human activity—cattle, pigs, chickens, rats, wheat, corn, and dandelions. By some estimates, 90 percent of all plant activity now occurs in environments shaped by human action.

The global spread of modern industry, heavily dependent on fossil fuels, generated dramatic changes in the air, water, soil, and atmosphere with profound impacts on human life. China’s spectacular economic growth since the 1980s, fueled largely by coal, has resulted in the equally spectacular pall of air pollution in its major cities. In 2004, the World Bank reported that twelve of the world’s twenty most polluted cities were in China. Degradation of the world’s rivers, seas, and oceans has also mounted as pesticides, herbicides, chemical fertilizers, detergents, oil, sewage, industrial waste, and plastics have made their way from land to water. By the 1960s, Lake Erie in the United States was widely reported as “dead.” The Great Pacific Garbage Patch, an area of about 7 million square miles in the North Pacific, has trapped an enormous quantity of marine debris, mostly plastics, endangering oceanic food webs and proving deadly to creatures of the sea, which ingest or become entangled in this human garbage. Industrial pollution in the Soviet Union rendered about half of the country’s rivers severely polluted by the late 1980s, while fully 20 percent of its population lived in regions defined as “ecological disasters.” In addition, the release of chemicals known as chlorofluorocarbons thinned the ozone layer, which protects the earth from excessive ultraviolet radiation.

The most critical and intractable environmental challenge of recent decades has been global warming. Scientists became concerned about this phenomenon in the 1970s, although their research drew on earlier studies dating to the nineteenth century. By the end of the twentieth century, a worldwide scientific consensus had emerged that a dangerously warming climate was well under way, driven by human actions. Particularly responsible for this global warming has been the vastly increased burning of fossil fuels, which release heat-trapping greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, as well as by the loss of trees that would otherwise remove the carbon dioxide from the air. By 2014, carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere, which had been roughly 275 ppm (parts per million) before the Industrial Revolution, had risen to 400 ppm, well above the level of 350 ppm that is generally considered “safe.” Scientists have associated this global warming with all manner of environmental changes, both current and projected: the melting of glaciers and the rising of sea levels; extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, hurricanes, and typhoons; increased acidification of the oceans; decreased crop yields; disruptions of ecosystems and the extinction of many species. All of this has varied and will continue to vary substantially from region to region, but serious observers have begun to speak about the possibility of “a crisis that threatens our survival as a species.”

Beyond these weather- and climate-related changes, global warming has interacted with a variety of social conditions—poverty, inequality, oppression—to generate or exacerbate conflict and upheaval. Syria’s bitter civil war, which has
EXPERIENCING THE ANTHROPOCENE ERA: ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTALISM

killed over 200,000 people and displaced or made refugees of many millions more since 2011, followed on the heels of a severe and prolonged drought and related crop failures. More broadly, in 2010 and 2011 extreme weather conditions characteristic of global warming—droughts, dust storms, fires, heavy rainfall—afflicted many grain-producing regions of the world, including Canada, Russia, China, Argentina, and Australia, causing a sharp spike in grain prices on the world market. The Middle East and North Africa, heavily dependent on grain imports, experienced sharply rising food prices, arguably aggravating social unrest and contributing to the political protests of the Arab Spring. Even the American military has taken climate change seriously. A 2007 report by a number of senior retired officers concluded that “climate change poses a serious threat to America’s national security . . . [and] acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.”

Green and Global

Modern environmentalism, with its awareness of ecological damage and a desire to counteract it, dates to the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century. One strand in this “first-wave environmentalism” lay in a direct response to early industrialization. Romantic poets such as William Blake and William Wordsworth denounced the industrial era’s “dark satanic mills,” which threatened the “green and pleasant land” of an earlier England. In opposing the extension of railroads, the British writer John Ruskin in 1876 declared, “The frenzy of avarice is daily drowning our sailors, suffocating our miners, poisoning our children and blasting the cultivable surface of England into a treeless waste of ashes.” Mahatma Gandhi came into contact with this strand of thinking during his time in England during the late 1880s. “God forbid,” he later wrote, “that India should ever take to industrialism after the manner of the West.” Another element in early environmentalism, especially prominent in the United States and Germany, derived from a concern with deforestation, drought, and desertification as pioneering settlers, lumbermen, miners, and the owners of colonial plantations inflicted terrible damage on the woodlands and pasturelands of the world. Articulated primarily by men of science, often those working in the colonial world, this approach sought to mobilize scientific expertise and state control to manage, contain, and tame modern assaults on the environment.

Protecting remaining wilderness areas was yet another aspect of early environmentalism. The first international environmental conference, held in London in 1900, aimed at preserving African wildlife from voracious European hunters. In the United States, it was the opening of the west to European settlers that threatened the natural order. “With no eye to the future,” wrote naturalist John Muir in 1897, “these pious destroyers waged interminable forest wars . . . , spreading ruthless devastation ever wider and further.” Muir understood the economic rationale for preserving the wilderness, but for him it also held spiritual significance. “Wilderness is
Guided Reading Question

What differences emerged between environmentalism in the Global North and that in the Global South?

a necessity . . . not only as fountains of timber and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life.” This kind of sensibility found expression in the American national parks, the first of which, Yellowstone, was established in 1872.

These early examples of environmental awareness were distinctly limited, largely a product of literary figures, scientists, and some government officials. None of them attracted a mass following or provoked a global response. But “second-wave environmentalism,” beginning in the 1960s, did both of these things, even as it found expression in many quite different ways.

This new phase of environmentalism is most often associated with the publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, exposing the chemical contamination of the environment with a particular emphasis on the use of pesticides. The book struck a chord with millions, triggering environmental movements on both sides of the Atlantic. (See Zooming In: Rachel Carson, page 1058.) Ten years later, the Club of Rome, a global think tank, issued a report called Limits to Growth, which warned of resource exhaustion and the collapse of industrial society in the face of unrelenting economic and population growth. Soon a mounting wave of environmental books, articles, treatises, and conferences emerged in Europe and North America, pushing back in various ways against the postwar emphasis on “development” and unending economic growth. That sensibility was aptly captured in the title of a best-selling book by British economist E. F. Schumacher in 1973: Small Is Beautiful.

But what most clearly distinguished second-wave environmentalism was widespread grassroots involvement and activism. By the late 1990s, millions of people in North America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand had joined one of the rapidly proliferating environmental organizations, many of them local. The issues addressed in these burgeoning movements were many and various: pollution, resource depletion, toxic waste, protecting wildlife habitats, nuclear power and nuclear testing, limiting development, and, increasingly at the top of the agenda in the twenty-first century, climate change. Beyond particular issues, proponents of “deep ecology” put forward an understanding of the world in which human beings were no longer at the center but occupied a place of equivalence with other species. Those supporting an “environmental justice” outlook were more concerned with the unequal impact of environmental problems on the poor, minorities, and developing countries.

The tactics of these movements were as varied as the issues they addressed. Much attention was given to public education and lobbying governments and corporations, often through highly organized and professionally run organizations. In Germany, New Zealand, and Australia, environmentalists created Green parties, which contested elections and on occasion shared power. Teach-ins, demonstrations, street protests, and various local actions also played a role in the strategies of environmental activists.

In the communist world, environmentalism was constrained by highly authoritarian states, which were committed to large-scale development. In the late 1980s,
the Chinese government, for example, sharply repressed groups critical of the enormous Three Gorges Dam project across the Yangzi River. By the early twenty-first century, however, a grassroots environmental movement had taken root in China, expressed in hundreds of private groups and state-sponsored organizations. Many of these sought to ground their activism in Buddhist or Daoist traditions that stressed the harmony of humankind and the natural order. The Chinese state itself has enacted a large body of environmental laws and regulations. In the Soviet Union during the 1970s and later, environmentalists were able to voice their concerns about the shrinking of the Aral Sea, pollution threats to Lake Baikal in Siberia, and poor air quality in many cities. After the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986, Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost allowed greater freedom of expression as environmentalist concerns became part of a broader challenge to communism and Russian domination (see Chapter 21, pages 961–62).

Quite quickly, during the 1970s and 1980s, environmentalism also took root in the Global South, where it frequently assumed a distinctive character compared to the more industrialized countries. It was more locally based and had fewer large national organizations than in the West; it involved more poor people in direct actions; it was less engaged in political lobbying and corporate strategies; it was more concerned with issues of food security, health, and basic survival than with the rights of nature or wilderness protection; and it was more closely connected to movements for social justice. Thus, whereas Western environmentalists defended forests where few people lived, the Chikpo, or “tree-hugging,” movement in India sought to protect the livelihood of farmers, artisans, and herders living in areas subject to extensive deforestation. A massive movement to prevent or limit the damming of India’s Narmada River derived from the displacement of local people; similar anti-dam protests in the American Northwest were more concerned with protecting salmon runs.

In the Global South, this “environmentalism of the poor” took shape in various ways, often in opposition to the gigantic development projects of national governments. Residents of the Brazilian Amazon basin, facing the loss of their livelihood to lumbering interests, ranchers, and government road-building projects, joined hands and directly confronted workers sent to cut down trees with their chainsaws. When the Thai government sought to create huge eucalyptus plantations, largely to supply Japanese-owned paper mills, Buddhist teachers, known as “ecology monks,” mobilized peasants to put their case to public officials. In the Philippines, coalitions of numerous local groups—representing various religious, women’s, human rights, indigenous peoples’, peasant, and political organizations—mobilized large-scale grassroots movements against foreign-owned mining companies. And in Kenya, the Green Belt Movement organized groups of village women to plant millions of trees intended to forestall the growth of deserts and protect the soil.

By the early twenty-first century, environmentalism had become a matter of global concern and had prompted change at many levels. National governments acted to curtail pollution and to foster the use of renewable energy sources. By
Rachel Carson, Pioneer of Environmentalism

"Over increasingly large areas of the United States, spring now comes unheralded by the return of the birds, and the early mornings are strangely silent." This was the appalling vision that inspired Silent Spring, a book that effectively launched the American environmental movement in 1962 with its devastating critique of unregulated pesticide use. Its author, Rachel Carson, was born in 1907 on a farm near Pittsburgh. Her childhood interest in nature led to college and graduate studies in biology and then a career as a marine biologist with the U.S. Department of Fisheries, where she was only the second woman hired for such a position. She was also finding her voice as a writer, penning three well-received books on the ecology of the sea.

Through this work, Carson gained an acute awareness of the intricate and interdependent web of life, but she assumed that "much of nature was forever beyond the tampering hand of man." However, the advent of the atomic age, with the dramatic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, shook her confidence that nature was immune to human action, and she began to question the widely held assumption that science always held positive outcomes for human welfare. That skepticism gradually took shape around the issue of pesticides and other toxins deliberately introduced into the environment in the name of progress. In 1958, a letter from a friend describing the death of birds in her yard following aerial spraying for mosquito control prompted Carson to take on a project that became Silent Spring. Initially she called it "Man against the Earth."

From government agencies, independent scientists, public health specialists, and her own network of contacts, Carson began to assemble data about the impact of pesticides on natural ecosystems and human health. While she never called for their complete elimination, she argued for much greater care and sensitivity to the environment in employing chemical pesticides. She further urged natural biotic agents as a preferable alternative for pest control. The book also criticized the government regulatory agencies for their negligent oversight and scientific specialists for their "fanatical zeal" to create "a chemically sterile insect-free world." Chemical

photo: Erich Hartmann/Magnum Photos

2014, Germany was edging up on getting 30 percent of its energy from such sources, most of it from solar and wind, while Brazil and Canada received 82 percent and 62 percent respectively from renewables, primarily hydropower. Furthermore, some 6,000 national parks in over 100 countries served to protect wildlife and natural beauty. In addition to governments, many businesses found it useful to become more clearly "green." Reforestation programs were accordingly under way in China, Honduras, Kenya, and elsewhere. In recent years, international agreements have come close to eliminating the introduction of ozone-depleting substances into the atmosphere. And millions of individuals have altered their way
companies, she wrote, gave out only “little tranquilizing pills of half-truth” when confronted with evidence of their products’ harmful results. While she worked hard to ensure the book’s scientific credentials, it was a passionate work, fueled by Carson’s “anger at the senseless brutish things that were being done.” It was also a book written under growing personal difficulties. Her mother, for whom she had long been a caretaker, died in 1958, while Carson’s own health too deteriorated as cancer and other ailments took their toll.

When *Silent Spring* was finally published in 1962, the book provoked a firestorm of criticism. Velsicol, a major chemical company, threatened a lawsuit to prevent its publication. Critics declared that following her prescriptions would mean “the end of all human progress,” even a “return to the Dark Ages [when] insects and diseases and vermin would once again inherit the earth.” Some of the attacks were more personal. Rachel Carson had never married, and Ezra Taft Benson, a former secretary of agriculture, wondered “why a spinster with no children was so concerned about genetics,” while opining that she was “probably a communist.” It was the height of the cold war era, and challenges to government agencies and corporate capitalism were often deemed “un-American” and “sinister.” Carson evoked such a backlash because she had called into question the whole idea of science as progress, so central to Western culture since the Enlightenment. Humankind had acquired the power to “alter the very nature of the [earth’s] life,” she declared. The book ended with a dire warning: “It is our alarming misfortune that so primitive a science has armed itself with the most modern and terrible weapons, and that in turning them against the insects, it has also turned them against the earth.”

But Carson also had a growing number of enthusiastic supporters. Before she died in 1964, she witnessed the vindication of much of her work. Honors and awards poured in; she more than held her own against her critics in a CBS News program devoted to her book; and a presidential Science Advisory Committee cited Carson’s work while recommending the “orderly reduction of persistent pesticides.” Following her death, a range of policy changes reflected her work, including the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 and the banning of the insecticide DDT in 1973. *Silent Spring* also motivated many to join the growing array of environmentalist groups.

Approaching her death, Carson applied her ecological understanding of the world to herself as well. In a letter to her best friend not long before she died, she recalled seeing some monarch butterflies leaving on a journey from which they would not return. And then she added: “When the intangible cycle has run its course, it is a natural and not unhappy thing that a life comes to an end.”

Question: In what larger contexts might we understand Rachel Carson and the book that gained her such attention?

of life, agreeing to recycle, to install solar panels, to buy fuel-efficient cars, to shop in local markets, and to forgo the use of plastic bags.

But will these piecemeal efforts be enough to avoid the catastrophes that scientists predict will occur if global warming continues unchecked? Effective action on climate change, surely the most critical issue of the twenty-first century, has been difficult, partly because it would require some adjustment for citizens and corporations in the Global North and for elites everywhere. Furthermore, large-scale international agreement on global warming has come up against sharp conflicts between the Global North and South. Both activists and governments in the developing
Environmentalism in Action

These South Korean environmental activists are wearing death masks and holding crosses representing various countries during an antinuclear protest in Seoul in 1996, exactly ten years after a large-scale nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. The lead protester holds a placard reading “Don’t forget Chernobyl!” (Yun Jai-hyoung/AP Photo)

countries have often felt that Northern initiatives to address atmospheric pollution and global warming would curtail their industrial development, leaving the North/South gap intact. “The threat to the atmospheric commons has been building over centuries,” argued Indian environmentalist Vandana Shiva, “mainly because of industrial activity in the North. Yet . . . the North refuses to assume extra responsibility for cleaning up the atmosphere. No wonder the Third World cries foul when it is asked to share the costs.” A Malaysian official put the dispute succinctly: “The developed countries don’t want to give up their extravagant lifestyles, but plan to curtail our development.” Western governments argued that newly industrializing countries such as China and India must also agree to specific limits on their growing emissions if further global warming is to be prevented. Such deep disagreements between industrialized and developing countries have contributed to the failure of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But negotiations continue regarding a climate change treaty that would be legally binding on all parties or at least voluntarily accepted by them. Beyond such efforts to limit green-
house gas emissions, more exotic solutions have also surfaced such as capturing and
burying carbon emissions or injecting light-reflecting sulfur particles into the
atmosphere.

More than any other widespread movement, global environmentalism came to
symbolize “one world” thinking, a focus on the common plight of humankind
across the artificial boundaries of nation-states. It also marked a challenge to modern-
ity itself, particularly its consuming commitment to endless growth. The ideas of
sustainability and restraint, certainly not prominent in any list of modern values,
entered global discourse and marked the beginnings of a new environmental ethic.
This change in thinking, although limited, was perhaps the most significant achieve-
ment of global environmentalism.

REFLECTIONS

Pondering the Past: Limitations and Possibilities

All of us engaged in the study of world history describe global changes, make global
comparisons, assess connections among distant peoples, and explain, as best we can,
and sometimes amid intense controversy, why things turned out as they did. But to
put it mildly, these are not easy tasks, and the entire enterprise is subject to various
challenges and to some outright limitations. One challenge derives from the limita-
tions of our sources. We simply lack information about much that we would like
to uncover. Who wouldn’t like to know more about the thinking of our distant
ancestors, the life of the Buddha or Jesus, or what was in the mind of Stalin during
the upheavals of the 1930s? When written records are not available, scholars depend
largely on material remains as they seek to reconstruct the past. Even when written
sources are more plentiful, these materials often reflect the narrow experience of
elites, leaving few sources available to assist in understanding the lives of women,
peasants, slaves, and other marginalized groups.

Another challenge for students of world history lies in the particularities of time
and place. In seeking to understand the past, we all start from somewhere spe-
cific—our own time and our own culture. Whether we are insiders or outsiders to
the societies we explore, all of us operate within a set of assumptions and values that
shape our understanding of the past. Views of Columbus in 1992, the 500th anni-
versary of his arrival in the Americas, differed greatly from what they had been a
century earlier. Many in his Italian homeland no doubt view him differently than
do Native Americans. The absence of women, until quite recently, from many
historical accounts owes something to the fact that most writers of history were
men. In these differences of time, place, gender, and position in society lies the
source of much of the controversy that attends the study of history. It makes finality
and objectivity difficult to achieve.

A further limitation derives from the unalterable “otherness” of every person.
This is not so much a matter of ignorance as of mystery. Most of us have some
difficulty understanding ourselves and those with whom we are on intimate terms in any full and final fashion. It is not so much that we lack information, but that we run up against what Elizabeth Cady Stanton famously called the “solitude of the self,” which “no eye nor touch of man or angel has ever pierced.” This profound individuality, this essential singularity, of every person makes it difficult to penetrate the inner recesses of human motivation, which are among the major drivers of the historical process.

Despite the challenges and limitations, as historians and students of history, we persist in the task, seeking what knowledge we can achieve, what insights we can gain, what perspective on our own lives we can generate. In doing so, historians have pioneered creative techniques for obtaining data—from DNA analysis to critical reading of ancient texts. We also make concerted efforts to identify our own assumptions and outlooks and, so far as is humanly possible, to set them aside as we seek to grasp the worlds of other times and places. We have at our disposal the marvelous human capacity of informed imagination: the ability to empathize with others based on our common humanity and our knowledge of their particular circumstances.

But historical understanding is always incomplete, relative, and subject to change. Nonetheless, the achievements of the historical enterprise are impressive and enormously enriching. Our subject—world history—makes us witnesses to the broad contours of the human journey and provides a context in which our individual lives can find a place and, perhaps, a measure of meaning. It serves to open us to and inform us about the wider world that shapes our daily experience. If we base our understanding of life only on what we personally experience in our own lives, we render ourselves both impoverished and ineffective.

World history opens a marvelous window into the unfamiliar. It confronts us with the “ways of the world,” the whole panorama of human achievement, tragedy, and sensibility. It allows us some modest entry into the lives of people far removed from us in time and place. And it offers us company for the journey of our own lives. Pondering the global past with a receptive heart and an open mind can assist us in enlarging and deepening our sense of self. In exposing us to the wider experience of “all under Heaven,” as the Chinese put it, world history can aid us in becoming wiser and more mature persons. That is among the many gifts that the study of the global past, despite its various challenges and limitations, offers to us all.

**Chapter Review**

**What’s the Significance?**

- neoliberalism, 1026
- reglobalization, 1026–29
- transnational corporations, 1027–28

North/South gap, 1030–32
- anti-globalization, 1032–33
- Prague Spring, 1036
Big Picture Questions

1. In what ways did the Global North/South divide find expression in the past century?
2. What have been the benefits and drawbacks of globalization since 1945?
3. Do the years since 1914 confirm or undermine Enlightenment predictions about the future of humankind?
4. "The most recent century marks the end of the era of Western dominance in world history." What evidence might support this statement? What evidence might contradict it?
5. To what extent did the various liberation movements of the past century—communism, nationalism, democracy, feminism, internationalism—achieve their goals?
6. Looking Back: To what extent did the processes discussed in this chapter (globalization, feminism, fundamentalism, environmentalism) have roots in the more distant past? In what respects did they represent something new in the past century?

Next Steps: For Further Study


Faces of Globalization

Not many people in the world of the early twenty-first century remain untouched by globalization. For most of humankind, the pervasive processes of interaction among distant peoples have shaped the clothing we wear, the foods we eat, the products we consume, the ways we work, the music we listen to, the religions we practice, and the identities we assume. Such interactions are, in fact, difficult to avoid. The images that follow offer just a few reminders of the many dimensions of this immense process and provide grist for the mill of our reflection upon them.

Among the common experiences of globalization for some people living in Asia, Africa, or Latin America has been that of working in foreign-owned production facilities. Companies in wealthier countries have often found it advantageous to build such facilities in places where labor is less expensive or environmental regulations are less restrictive. China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Mexico, Brazil, and various African states are among the countries that have hosted foreign-owned manufacturing operations. The worst of them—in terms of child labor, low pay, few benefits, and dangerous working conditions—have been called “sweatshops.” Such abuses have generated an international movement challenging those conditions.

Source 23.1 illustrates an interesting twist on this common feature of a globalized world economy—a Chinese-owned company producing Western-style blue jeans in Lesotho, a small country in southern Africa. The photo on page 1028 shows a parallel phenomenon—the outsourcing of services such as call centers as well as manufacturing.

- Why might China, itself the site of many foreign-owned factories, place such a factory in Africa? What does this suggest about the changing position of China in the world economy? What is the significance of the blue jeans for an understanding of contemporary globalization?

- Does this photograph conform to your image of a sweatshop? Why might many developing countries accept foreign-owned production facilities, despite the criticisms of the working conditions in them?

- Why do you think most of the workers in this photo are women? How might you imagine their motivations for seeking this kind of work? Keep in mind that the unemployment rate in Lesotho in the early twenty-first century was 45 percent.
What differences can you observe between the workers in this assembly factory and those in the Indian call center shown on page 1028? Do you imagine that workers in either setting consider themselves fortunate or exploited?

If globalization offered employment opportunities—albeit in often-wretched conditions—to some people in the developing countries, it also promoted a worldwide culture of consumerism. That culture placed the accumulation of material goods, many of them of Western origin, above older values of spiritual attainment or social responsibility. Nowhere has this culture of consumerism been more prominent than in China, where the fading of Maoist communism, the country’s massive economic growth, and its new openness to the wider world combined to generate an unabashed materialism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. A popular slogan suggested that life in modern China required the “eight bigs”: color TV, refrigerator, stereo, camera, motorcycle, a suite of furniture, washing machine, and an electric fan. Source 23.2 illustrates this culture of consumerism as well as one of the “eight bigs” in a poster from the post-Mao era. The poster on page 960 in Chapter 21 provides further illustration of Chinese consumerism.
Source 23.2 Globalization and Consumerism
In what ways might these images be used to illustrate westernization, modernization, globalization, and consumerism?

How might the young people on the motorcycle understand their own behavior? Do you think they are conscious of behaving in Western ways, or have these ways become Chinese?

What is the significance of a Chinese couple riding a Suzuki motorcycle, a Japanese product probably manufactured in China under a license agreement?

Beyond consumerism, how does this poster reflect changes in relationships between men and women in China after Mao? Is this yet another face of globalization, or does it remain a distinctly Western phenomenon?

How might these images be read as a celebration of Chinese success? How might they be used to criticize contemporary Chinese society?

During the last several decades of the twentieth century, the process of economic globalization spawned various movements of resistance and criticism (see pages 1032–33). In dozens of developing countries, protesters demonstrated or rioted against government policies that removed subsidies, raised prices on essential products, froze salaries, or cut back on social services. Because such policies were often required by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund as a condition for receiving much-needed loans, protesters often directed their anger at these international financial institutions. Activists in developed and developing countries alike have mounted large-scale protests against what they see as the abuses of unregulated corporate power operating in the world economy.

Source 23.3 shows one such activist in São Paulo, Brazil, during a demonstration in 2013, part of a series of marches and protests against the biotech giant Monsanto that were held in many countries around the world. The sign reads: “A better world according to Monsanto is a world with more cancer.” A major producer of herbicides and genetically modified foods, Monsanto had also earlier in its history manufactured a number of highly controversial chemicals such as DDT, PCBs, Agent Orange, and bovine growth hormones. Its insistence on patent rights to some of its products has also generated contentious debate.

What do the slogans and symbolism of this image reveal about the criticisms of corporate globalization? What political message does it convey?

To what groups of people might such images be most compelling? How might Monsanto respond to such protesters?
Among the many faces of globalization, none has grown more rapidly than Internet usage. In 1995, there were about 16 million users of the Internet, representing 0.4 percent of the world's population. By 2014, that number had swelled to almost 3 billion people, or 41 percent of the world's population. That kind of connectivity had profound implications for business, education, religion, social relationships, and politics. Source 23.4 shows a scene from the Arab Spring uprising in Cairo, Egypt, in early 2011 and illustrates the role of Internet-based social media such as Facebook and Twitter in mobilizing support during such protests. The sign around the young man's neck reads: "The age of fear has come to an end." It referred to the regime of longtime dictatorial ruler Hosni Mubarak, which was eventually overthrown in the uprising.

- How do you think this young man would describe Facebook? How might he see it in relationship to the injustice and fear to which his signs refer?
- How does his understanding and use of Facebook compare to yours?
What capacities of the Internet and social media have made them such powerful political tools?

In what other ways has the Internet transformed life on the planet and your own life?

Beyond politics and economics, globalization has had cultural dimensions as well. Various linguistic, religious, culinary, and artistic traditions have spread globally. Among them is yoga, a mind/body practice from India that has become a part of global culture. Source 23.5 shows a yoga class in a treatment program for teenagers facing homicide and robbery charges in a Mexico City prison in 2013. The instructor is a thirty-eight-year-old former drug dealer.

Why might yoga be a helpful tool in dealing with young people charged with serious crimes?

What does the use of yoga in a Mexican prison tell us about the globalization process and the assimilation of foreign practices?
The physical postures of yoga were long associated with and often a preparation for spiritual practices such as meditation, leading to a sense of union with the Divine. In what respects has yoga lost its original spiritual function as it has become assimilated into the cultures of many countries?

What other cultural patterns from beyond the West have found a place in European and North American life as globalization has unfolded?
Source 23.6, a composite satellite photograph of the world at night taken in late 2000, reflects three aspects of the globalization process. The first is the growing consciousness of the earth as a single place, the common home of humankind. Such thinking has been fostered by and expressed in those many remarkable images of the earth taken from space or from the moon (see the photo on page 1022). In such photographs, no artificial boundaries of state or nation are visible, just a solitary planet cast against the immeasurable vastness of space. Second, this photograph shows the globalization of electricity, a central feature of modern life, which has taken place since the late nineteenth century. Third, and finally, the relative levels of electrification depicted in this image reflect the sharp variations in modern development across the planet as the twenty-first century dawned.

- To what extent has your thinking about the earth and its inhabitants been shaped by images such as this?
- Based on the electrification evident in this photo, what does this image show about the economic divisions of the world in the early twenty-first century?
- Does this image support or contradict the Snapshot on page 1031? What features of this image might you find surprising?
DOING HISTORY

Faces of Globalization

1. **Defining differences:** Based on these images and the text of Chapter 23, in what different ways have various groups of people experienced globalization since the end of World War II?

2. **Noticing change:** Based on these images as well as those in the text of Chapter 23, in what respects does contemporary globalization differ from that of earlier times? What continuities might you observe? Consider in particular the question of who is influencing whom. Does recent globalization represent largely the impact of the West on the rest of the world, or is it more of a two-way street?

3. **Making assessments:** Opinions about contemporary globalization depend heavily on the position of observers—their class, gender, or national locations. How might you illustrate this statement using the images in this chapter?

4. **Seeking further evidence:** What images might you choose to illustrate visually the various faces of contemporary globalization? What images can you imagine that might be relevant fifty or a hundred years from now?
Multiple-Choice Questions

Use the chart on page 892 and your knowledge of world history to answer questions 1–3.

1. According to the chart, which of the following would be the best date to set the beginning of the global Great Depression?
   a. 1926, when Germany’s unemployment rate increased
   b. 1929, when Germany, Great Britain, and the United States saw increases in unemployment
   c. 1932, when unemployment peaked in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States
   d. 1938, when unemployment rose in Great Britain and the United States

2. Which answer below best explains the rapid decrease in Germany’s unemployment rate after 1933?
   a. Germany’s communist government began its first five-year plan in 1933, investing in sweeping agricultural programs.
   b. Massive foreign aid from the United States revived Germany’s economy.
   c. The National Socialist government in Germany began public building projects and increased military spending.
   d. The Weimar government sent all workers from Germany’s African and Asian colonies back to their homelands, freeing up jobs for German-born citizens.

3. Which of the following is the most likely explanation for why Great Britain appeared to be less affected by the Great Depression than either Germany or the United States?
   a. Because of its colonies, Great Britain was more able to be self-sufficient in the global economy.
   b. Because it lost millions of men in World War I, Britain’s unemployment rate stayed artificially low.
   c. Great Britain experienced a boom-and-bust cycle that was less intense than that of Germany and the United States.
   d. Because its share of the global economy was twice that of the United States and Germany, Great Britain was able to maintain a low unemployment rate.
Short-Answer Question

4. Answer parts A, B, and C.
   A. Briefly explain ONE specific historical example of how a change in state economic policies of the Soviet Union influenced another nation’s economic policies in the period 1920–1990.
   B. Briefly explain a SECOND specific historical example of how a change in state economic policies of the Soviet Union influenced the economic policies of a nation other than the one discussed in part A in the period 1920–1990.
   C. Briefly explain ONE specific historical example of how continuity in state economic policies of the Soviet Union influenced another nation’s economic policies in the period 1920–1990.

Document-Based Question

Directions: Question 5 refers to the following documents. You will likely need to flip back and forth between these documents to answer the question adequately. Use scrap pieces of paper or sticky notes to tab these documents. When answering the question, refer to the “Advice for Responding to a DBQ” on the inside of the back cover.

5. Using the following documents from this textbook and your knowledge of world history, analyze political, social, and economic themes related to the global wars of the twentieth century: World War I, World War II, and the cold war.

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Long-Essay Question

When answering the following question, refer to the “Advice for Responding to an LEQ” on the inside of the back cover.

6. Evaluate the extent to which World War II (1937–1945) marked a turning point in colonialism, analyzing what changed and what stayed the same from the period before the war to the period during and after it.